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June 27, 1967.]

JOHN MARKLEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLAUDE
A. BEAGLE et al., Defendants, Cross-defendants and
Appellants ; TRAVER J. SMITH, as Testamentary
Trustee, etc., et al, Defendants, Cross-complainants and
Appellants.
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Liability to Third Persons-ActionsEvidence--Sufficiency.-In an action for damages for injuries
received when a warehouse railing gave way, a jury verdict
for plaintiff against the owners of the building was sufficiently supported by the evidence, where the plaintiff was an
employee of an independent contractor engaged by the owners'
tenant, and therefore a business invitee of the owners, and
where the jury could reasonably conclude that the dangerous
condition of the railings was due to work previously done by
other contractors engaged by the owners and the owners were
negligent in failing to discover such condition and to correct it
or adequately warn plaintiff of it.
[2] Damages-Instructions-Impairment of Earning CapacitY.-A
trial court's instruction, after plaintiff's medical expert had
testified to his estimate of plaintiff's loss of earning capacity,
did not tend to prejudice defendants by telling the jury tha t
elements of damages could be "proved by evidence which, if
believed, fixes the amount precisely or places it within precise
limits, or gives you adequate information to enable you to fix
the loss with a reasonable degree of certainty," where there
was no reason to conclude that such instruction (with its
clearly stated alternative that the evidence need merely be
adequate to enable the jury to fix the loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty) misled the jury into believing that the
expert's estimate was deemed by the court to be precise.
[Sa, Sb] Landlord and Tenant-Liability to Third Persons-Duties
to Invitees of Tenant: As Governed by Labor Code.-There
was no basis for limiting the responsibility of owners of a
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors, § 24.
lIcK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 318(3); [2]
Damages, § 203; [3] Landlord and Tenant, §§ 316(7), 318(4) (f);
[4] Master and Servant, §2; [5] Evidence, ~§210, 285; [6] Evidence, § 209; Master and Servant, § 149; [7] Evidence, §§ 210,
238; Master and Servant, § 149; [8] Master and Servant, § 149;
Evidence, §§ 209, 249; Records, § 35; [9, 15] Indemnity, § 21; [10]
Landlord and Tenant, §§ 318(3), 318(5); Indemnity, § 21; [11]
Indemnity, § 5; [12] Contracts, § 160; [13, 14] Indemnity, § 6.
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building, with regard to compliance with Labor Code safety
railing orders, and the trial court did not err in instructing
the jury that such orders were applicable to them, where
plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor retained
by the tenant, was injured in a place of employment provided
by the owners to penuit servicing of the tenant's equipment,
and the injury resulted from a negligent condition existing
after other contractors, retained by the owners, had finished
working on the premises.
Master and Servant-Existence of Relationship.-Under Lab.
Code, § 6304, defining "employer," an employer-employee relationship between the person injured and the owner of a place
of employment is not essential for application of the Labor
Code generally.
Evidence - Admissions-Agents - Limitations on Reception:
Res Gestae-Declarations After Transaction.-The statement,
to plaintiff's investigator, of a former employee of defendant
contractors, as to work done on the premises of codefendant
owners, was not admissible as a spontaneous declaration, nor
as a vicarious admission within the scope of his employment,
where the statement was made almost a year after plaintift
was injured and even longer after the work was done, and
when the employee was no longer employed by the contractor
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1807, subd. 5; Evid. Code, § 1222), nor was
i,t admissible as a declaration against interest, where the employee in no way admitted that he was negligent.
Id.-Admissions-Agents of a Party: Master and Servant-Actions-Admissibility of Evidence.-Former Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1851 (now recodified in Evid. Code, §§ 1224,1302), providing
that, where the question in dispute between parties is the
obligation of a third person,· whatever would be the evidence
for or against such person is prima facie evidence between the
parties, did not change the rule that hearsay statements of an
agent or employee not otherwise admissible against the principal or employer are not made admissible merely because they
may tend to prove negligence of the agent or employee that
may be imputed to the principal or employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Id.-Admissions-Agents of Party-Limitations on Reception:
Hearsay-Application of Rule of Exclusion: Master and
Servant-Actions-Admissibility of Evidence.-In an ordinary
negligence action against an employer whose liability mayor
may not tum on the negligence of any particular empioyee or
ex-employee who has given hearsay statements about the work
out of which an accident arose, there is no basis for an
assumption of reliability that would justify dispensing with
the oath and cross-examination so as to exclude the operation
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of the hearsay role, unless such statements qualify as spontaneous declarations, were made within the scope of the employment, or were so damaging as to be admissible as declarations
against interest.
[8] Master and Servant-Actions-Admissibility of Evidence:
Evidence-Admissions-Agents of a Party: Hearsay-Exceptions-Dedarations: Records-Judicial Records.-The terms
"obligation or duty" in former Code Civ. Proc., § 1851, relating
to prima facie evidence, and ''liability, obligation, or duty" in
Evid. Code, §§ 1224 and 1302, relating to exceptions to the
hearsay rule, do not include tort liabilities of employees that
are imputed to their employers under the doctrine of respondeat
8uperior.
[9] Indemnity-Actions-Evidence--Admissibility.-In an owners'
action for indemnity against their contractors, the liability of
an employee of the contractors was not a ''liability, obligation,
or duty" within the meanings of Code Civ. Proc., § 1851 and
Evid. Code, §§ 1224,1302, relating to prima facie evidence a~d
exceptions to the hearsay role, where it was imputable to the
eontractors only under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
[10] Landlord and Tenant-Liabilities to'l'hird Persons-Evidence: Harmless Error: Indemnity-Actions-Evidence and
Review.-In a personal injury action against the owners of a
building and the contractors who had performed work thereon, in which the owners filed a cross-complaint for indemnity
against the contractors, the erroneous admission of a hearsay
statement by a former employee of the contractors, tending to
place responsibility on the contractors for creating the dangerous condition of the premises, was not prejudicial to the
defendant owners, where the statement had no bearing on
whether the owners should have discovered that condition, and
where, moreover, it was the owners who offered the statement
in evidence, but was prejudicial to the contractors as to the
judgments aganist them in favor of the plaintiff and of the
owners on their cross-complaint.
[11] Indemnity-Operation and Interpretation.-The extent of
contractors' duty to indemnify the owners of property mUllt be
determined from the contract and not from the independent
doctrine of equitable indemnity, where the parties expressly
contracted with respect thereto.
[12] Oontracts - Interpretation - Functions of Courts. - In the
absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of
a contract is a question for the court.
[13] Indemnity-Operation and Interpretation-Liabilities Covered.-An indemnity contract by which contractors agreed to
hold owners hannless and defend them in "any suit at law for
damages which might arise in connection with the agreed
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work" upon the owners' premises was not limited to causes of
action arising while the work was in progress, but included
causes of action arising thereafter.
[14] Id. - Operation and Interpretation - Liabilities Covered._~
Me~ nonfeasance by an indemnitee, such as negligent failure
to discover a dangerous condition arising from the work per·
fonned by indemnitor contractors, will not preclude indemnit)
under an indemnity clause phrased in general terms such al
one covering "any suit at law for damages which might arise:
in connection with the agreed work."
[16] Id.-Actions-Trial, Evidence and Review.-In a persona
injury action, in which the owners sought indemnity fron
their contractors, the trial court did not err in denying th.
contractors' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdic
for the owners, made on the ground that the contract pre
eluded any duty to indemnify, where the indemnity clause wa:
. phrased in general tenns and where there was substantia
evidence that the plaintiff's cause of action arose in conneotioJ
with work performed by the contractors on the ownen
premises and that the negligence of the owners was passiv.
rather than active.

()

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Sacra
mento County and from orders denying motions for jud@
ment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new·trial. Charle
W. Johnson, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part and reverse
in part; order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdi(
affirmed; appeals from order denying new trial dismiMed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained by workman l
defective railing gave way; cross-complaint for indemnity b
owners against contractors. Judgment for plaintiff affirme
as against defendant owners and reversed as against defendru
contractors; judgment for owners on cross-complaint aga.in
contractors reversed.
Rust & Hoffman, David C. Rust, and Ellis J. Horvitz fe
Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants.

.

McGregor, Bullen & McKone, McGregor, Bullen & Eric
find George W. Bullen for Defendants, Cross-defendants aI
Appellants.
[14] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indemnity, § 14; Am.Jur., Indemnity (1
ed § 15).
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Lancaster & Yorton and Burt Lancaster for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff was injured when a railing
along a mezzanine in a warehouse gave way and he fell to the
floor below. At the time of the accident he was going to the
roof of the building to service a fan of the ventilating system
of a restaurant on the ground floor. About ten months hefore
the accident, the owners of the building sold certain equipment to contractors who agreed to rt'll10ve it from the building
in a workmanlike manner. The equipment included bins that
had been built around the guardrail on the mrzzanine from
which plaintiff fell.
Plaintiff brought this action against the contractors and the
owners to recover damages for his personal injuries. He
alleged that the contractors negligently created the dangerous
condition of the railing in removing the bins and that the
owners negligently failed to inspect the premises and to either
correct the condition or warn plaintiff of the danger. The
owners cross-complained against the contrartors for indemnity
in the event plaintiff should recover a judgment against them.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff against tlJ(>
owners and contractors on the complaint and in favor of the
owners against the contractors on the cross-complaint. The
trial court entered judgments on the verdicts. The owners and
the contractors appeal from the judgments against them and
from an order denying their motions for a new trial. The
contractors also appeal from an order denying their motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the crosscomplaint. The appeals from the order denying the motions
for new trial must be dismissed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963; Rodriguez v. Barnett, 52 Ca1.2d 154, 156 [338 P .2d 907] .)
[1] The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict in
favor of plaintiff. The jury could reasonably conclude that in
removing the bins the contractors were negligent, either in
depriving the railing of support necessary to make it safe or
in removing the railing and then replacing it improperly.
Plaintiff was an employee of an independent contractor
engaged by the tenant who operated the restaurant to service
the ventilating system. He was therefore a business invitee of
the owners to whom they owed a duty of reasonable care.
They knew or should have known that he would use the nwzzanine to get to the fan on the roof, and the jury could
reasonably conclude that after the removal of the bins, the
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owners were negligent in failing to discover the dangerous
condition of the railing and to either correct it or adequately
warn plaintiff of it.
Both the contractors and the owners contend that the
combination of plaintiff's closing argument on the issue of
loss of future earnings and the trial court'8 instruction on
special damages resulted in prejudicial error.
[2] Plaintiff's medical expert testified to his estimate of
plaintiff's loss of future earning capacity, and in his argu:-ment plaintiff's counsel urged the jury to accept the expert's
E'stimate. After instructing with respect to past and future
medical expenses and past and future loss of earning capaci.
ty, the court instructed that" Any of the elements of damages
thus far specifically mentioned can be proved by evidence
which, if believed, fixes the amount precisely or places it
within precise limits, or gives you adequate information to
enable you to fix the loss with a reasonable degree of certainty." Defendants contend that this instruction in effect
told the jury that the expert's estimate of future loss of earning capacity was precise evidence and therefore misled the
jury into accepting plaintiff's argument that it should accept
the expert's estimate. There is no merit in this contention.
The expert's estimate provided a reasonable basis for determining plaintiff's future loss of earning capacity (see. CO'IInolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete 00., 49 Ca1.2d 483, 489 [319 P.2d
343]), and there is no reason to conclude that the instruction
misled the jury into believing that the expert's estimate was
deemed by the court to be precise. Thus, the .instruction
concluded with the clearly stated alternative that the evidence
need merely be adequate to enable the jury to fix the loss
"with a reasonable degree of certainty."
[Sa] The owners contend that the court erred in instructing the jury that safety orders governing railings issued
pursuant to the Labor Code were applicable to them. [4] The
term "employer" as used in the safety provisions of the
Labor Code is defined to include "every person having direction, management, control, or custody of any employment,
place of employment, or any employee. " (Lab. Code, § 6304.)
An employer-employee relationship between the person injured
.and the owner of a place of employment is not essential for
application of the Labor Code. (Porter v. Montgomery Ward
'" Co., 48 Cal.2d 846, 847-849 [313 P.2d 854].) [3b] In
the present case plaintiff was injured in a place of employment provided by the owners to permit servicing of their
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tenant's equipment, and the injury resulted from a condition
existing after the contractors had finished working on the
premises. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for
limiting the owners' responsibility to comply with the safety
urders (cf., Woolen v. Aerojet General C(Jlrp., 57 Ca1.2d 407,
412-413 [20 Cal.Rptr. 12, 369 P.2d 708]; Kuntz v. Del E.
Webb Constr. Co., 57 Ca1.2d 100, 106 [18 Cal.Rptr. 527, 368
P.2d 127]), and the trial court did not err in instructing the
jury with respect to those orders.
[5] The contractors contend that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence a statement made by Hood, one of
their employees, to an investigator representing plaintiff.
Hood was one of the workmen who participated ill removin~
the bins from the warehouse. He stated to the investigator
that the workmen had removed and reinstalled the guardrail
along the mezzanine from which plaintiff fell. He made the
statement after his employment with the contractors had
.terminated. It was offered in evidence by the owners over the
contractors' objection.
Since Hood's statement was made almost a year after the
accident happened when he was n9 longer employed by the
contractors, it was not admissible as· a spontaneous declaration
(see Dillon v. Wallace, 148 Cal.App.2d 447, 451-452 [306 P.2d
1044]) or a vicarious admission within the scope of his
employment. (See Code Civ. Proe., § 1870, subd. 5; Evid.
Code,- § 1222.) Nor was it admissible as a declaration against
interest, for Hood in no way admitted that he was negligent
or even stated just what he did, if anything, in removing and
replacing the railing. 1
[6] Plaintiff contends, however, that the statement was
admissible under former Code of Civil Procedure, section
1851, which provided: "And where the question in dispute
between the parties is the obligation or duty of -a third person,
1 The admissibility of declarations against interest is now governed by
section 1230 of the Evidence Code, which provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as
a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to
the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a
claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an
object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true." Although this section was not a}lplicable to
the trial in this case, which occurred before January 1,1967 (Evid. Code,
112), the comment of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary points out
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whatever would be the evidence for or against such person is
prima facie evidence between the parties." (This provision
has been recodified in Evidence Code, sections 1224 and 1302.)
lIe asserts that his cause of action against the (:.outra(·tors was
based in part on Hood's negligence in performing the work,
that Hood's responsibility for such negligence is ~m obligation
or duty of a third person, and that Hood's statement would
be admissible as an admission in an action against Hood even
though it did not qualify as a declaration against interest.
(See former Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 2; Evicl. CodE',
§ 1220; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1048, p. 4.) He
concludes that Hood's statement is therefore admissible undl>r
section 1851 against his employers. Similar reasoning may be
advanced to sustain the admissibility of Hood's statenwnt in
the owners' action for indemnity against the contractors, forthe duty to indemnify, just as the liability to plaintiff, might
arise from Hood's negligence in performing the work.
'Ve have found no case involving liability based on respondeat superior in which section 1851 has been applied or
discussed. It has frequently been applied in actions against
sureties or gua.~antors to permit the introduction into evidence of out-of-court statements of the defaulting party. (See,
e.g., 'Bittte County v. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1, 5 [18 P. 115] ; Nye
Nissen, Inc. v. Central etc. Ins. Corp., 71 Cal.App.2d 570, 576
[163 P~2d 100] ; Standard Oil 00. v. Houser, 101 Cal.App.2d
480,489 [225 P.2d 539].) It has also beenapplieu to sustain
the admissibility of a judgment against a corporation in an
:lction to enforce a stockholder's statutory liability (EUsworth v. Bradford, 186 Cal. 316, 325 [199 P. 335]) ;of an
admission of embezzlement by an employee in an action on hi-;
employer's indemnity bond (see Piggly Wiggly Yuma 00. v.
New York Indemnity Co., 116 Cal.App. 54], 542 [3 P.2fl
15] ) ; of an admission of receipt of summons by a judgment
(lebtor in an action against his insurf'r baspd (~n a d('fault
judgment against the judgment debtor (Langley v. Zurich
General .·ter. &- Liab. Ins. Co., 219 Cal. 101, 104 [25 P.2(1
418]); of a declaratory judgment fixing the rights of two

«

that «« Except for the requirement that the declarant be shown to be
unavailable as a witness, Section 1230 codifies the hearsay exception' for
derlaration::l against interest 1\::1 tllat exception has been developed by the
California courts (People v. Spriggs, 60 Ca1.2d 868, 36 Ca1.Rptr. 84:1, 389
P.2d 377 (1964» and possibly expands that exception." Even if Hood
was availahle :l.S a witness, since hi~ statement was not against intere8t
untler section ] 230, it was :11::10 not against interest under the law appJirable at the time of trial.
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joint venturers in an action by one of them against the
other's attorney for conversion of funds of the venture (Miller v. Rau, 216 Cal.App.2d 68, 78 [30 Cal.Rptr. 612]) ; and of
the admission of one joint owner of an automobile, in an
action against the other joint owner under the financial
responsibility laws, that she had given the driver permission
to drive (Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co., 139 Cal.App.2d H13, 19R
[293 P.2d 132]).
The language of section 1851 is susceptible of an interpretation that would make the statement of an employee admissible
in an action based on respondeat superior against his employer, and some commentators have urged that the principle of
the foregoing cases supports such an interpretation. (Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform
Rules of Evidence (Art. VIII,Hearsay Evidence), 6 Cal. Law
Revision Com. Rep., Appendix, pp. 495-496 (1964).) We are
convinced, however, that the failure of any .case to consider
that possibility was not the res~lt of oversight, but reflected a
tacit understanding that section 1851 did not change the
settled and apparently universally followed rule that hearsay
statements of an agent or employee not otherwise admissible
against the principal or employer are not made admissible
merely because they may tend to prove negligence of the
agent or employee that may be imputed to the principal or
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Miller v .
.Amon~8mith Ccmstr. Co., 185 Cal.App.2d 161, 166 [8 Cal.
Rptr. 131] ; Bridges v. County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal.App.
2d 151, 154 [280 P.2d 76] ; West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal.App.2d 771, 785 [138 P.2d 384] ; Taylor v. Bernheim, 58 Cal.App. 404,409,410 [209 P. 55] ; Herman Waldeck
cf Co. v. Pacific Ooast S.S. 00., 2 Cal.App. 167, 169 [83 P.
158] ; see Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 109, 122 [90 Am.
Dec. 230] [" The rule that would allow an agent, after a
transaction is closed, to admit away the rights of his principal, would be too dangerous to be tolerated for a moment
[citing cases]"]; see 19 Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 433; 1
R.C.L. 510, § 50; 75 A.L.R. 1534.)
In referring to the "question in dispute" as being "the
obligation or duty of a third person," we believe the statute
contemplated those situations in which such an obligation or
duty was an essential operative fact in establishing the cause
of action or defense involved. Such situations may arise when
the declarant and the party have a privity of interest in the
property involved (see Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co., supra, 139

I
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Cal.App.2d 193, 198) or the party is one who has assumed
responsibility for the obligations of the declarant, such as a
guarantor, surety, or insurer, or one, such as a shareholder,
made liable by statute for his corporation's debts. As Wigmore states: "So far as one person is privy in obligation with
another, i.e. is liable to be affected in his obligation under the
substantive law by the acts of the other, there is equal reason
for receiving against him such admissions of the other as
furnish evidence of the act which charges them equally." (4
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1077, p. 118.) He points
out that "the admissions of a person having virtually the
same interests . . . and the motive and means for- obtaining
knowledge will in general be likely to be equally worthy of
consideration" as the admissions of the party himself.
[7] These reasons for extending vicarious liability from
the substantive obligation involved to the admissibility of evidence to prove that obligation break down, however, in the
case of an ordinary negligence action against an employer
whose liability mayor may not turn on the negligence of any
particular employee or ex-employee who has given hearsay
statements about the work out of which an accident arose.
Unless such statements qualify as spontaneous declarations,
were. made within the scope of the employment, or are 80_
da.maging as to be admissible as declarations against interest,
there is no basis for an assumption of reliability that would
justify dispensing with the oath and cross-examination. In the
present case, for example, the very vagueness of Hood's
description of the work t which was given to plaintiff's
investigator very largely in answer to leading questions,
demonstrates how essential to fair elucidation it may be that
the evidence be secured only by deposition or at trial. [8] We
conclude that the terms "obligation or duty" in former section 1851 and "liability, obligation, or duty" in Evidence
Code sections 1224 and 1302 do not include tort liabilities of
employees that are imputed to their employers under the doctrine of respondeat superior. [9] Moreover, since any liability of Hood would only become a "question in dispute" in
the owners' action for indemnity against the contractors if it
was imputable to the contractors under the doctrine of respondeat superior, any such liability of Hood is also not a
"liability, obligation, or duty" within the meanings of the
statutes in the owners' indemnity action.
[10] The error was not prejudicial to the 'owners, for
Hood's statement tended to place responsibility on the con-

)
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tractors for creating the dangerous condition of the railing
and had no bearing on whether the owners should have
discovered that condition. Moreover, since the owners offered
the statement in evidence, they in no event could complain of
the trial court's ruling. The error was prejudicial to the
contractors, however, both as to the .judgment in favor of
plaintiff and the judgment in favor of the owners. There is a
direct conflict in the evidence whether, in removing the bins,
the contractors in any way changed the condition of the railing and whether the bins had served to hold the railing in
place. Although only the owners offered Hood's statement in
evidence, plaintiff urged its admissibility and relied upon it
in his argument to the jury to establish the contractors' liability. We conclude that had Hood's statement been excluded,
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have
exonerated the contractors from responsibility for the accident, both to plaintiff on his complaint and to the owners on
their cross-complaint. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v.
Watson,46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
The contractors contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the cross-complaint on the ground that their contract with the
owners precludes any duty to indemnify the owners under the
facts of this case.
The contract provides that" Contractor agrees to commence
said removal and demolition work immediately, and to cause
said removal and demolition work to progress in a diligent
and workmanlike manner. . . . Contractor shall use due diligence to protect the property of the owner in the performance
of the agreed work and will carry adequate public liability
insurance and property damage insurance to protect the
Owner and will hold Owner harmless and defend Owner in
any suit at law for damages which might arise in connection
with the agreed work. "
[11] Since the parties expressly contracted with respect to
the contractors' duty to indemnify the owners, the extent of
that duty must be determined from the contract and not from
the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity. (See City &County 0/ San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Ca1.2d 127, 130-138
[330 P.2d 802] ; cf. Horn &- Barker, Inc. v. Macco Corp., 228
Cal.App.2d 96, 101 [39 Cal.Rptr. 320] ; Pierce v. Turner, 205
Cal.App.2d 264, 267-268 [23 Cal.Rptr. 115]; American Can
Co. v. City &- County 0/ San Francisco, 202 Cal.App.2d 520,
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525 [21 Cal.Rptr. 33].) [12] In the absence of conflicting
extrinsic evidence the interpretation of the contract is a question for the court. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62
Ca1.2d 861,864 [44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839].)
[13] The contractors contend that their agreement to
indemnify'the owners was limited to causes of action arising
while the work was in progress and excluded causes of action
arising thereafter. There is no merit in this contention, for the
contract refers to "any suit at law for damages which might
arise in connection with the agreed work." There is no basis
for concluding that this clause does not mean what it says or
that the parties were concerned with "when" rather than
"how" a cause of action for damages might arise. Had they
so intended, it would have been a simple matter to provide
that the cause of action" arise in connection with and during
the agre,ed work. ' ,
An indemnity clause phrased in general terms will not be
interpreted, however, to provide indemnity for consequences
resulting from the indemnitee's own actively negligent acts.
(Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal.2d 40, 44-45
[41 Cal.Rptr. 73, 396 P .2d 377] ; Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec.
RY. Co., 52 Ca1.2d 411, 415 [340 P.2d 604].) [14] Mere
nonfeasance, however, such as a negligent failure to discover a
dangerous condition arising from the work will not preclude
indemnity under a general clause such as the one in this case.
(Harvey Machine Co. v. Hatzel if Buehler, Inc., 54 Ca1.2d 445,
448-449 [6 Cal.Rptr. 284, 353 P.2d 924] ; Baldwin Contracting
Co. v. Winston Steel Works, Inc., 236 Cal.App.2d 565, 571-573[46 Cal.Rptr. 421]; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Bonding if Ins. Co., 202 Cal.App.2d 99, 111-113 [20 Cal.Rptr.
820].) [15] Since there was substantial evidence that
plaintiff's cause of action arose in connection with the work
performed by the contractors and that the negligence of the
owners was passive rather than active, the trial court did not
err in denying the contractors' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The part of the judgment on the complaint in favor of
plaintiff and against the owners is affirmed. The part of the
jUdgment on the complaint in favor of plaintiff and against
the contractors is reversed. The judgment for the owners on
the cross-complaint is reversed. The order denying the motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed. The
appeals from the order denying the motions for new trial are
dismissed. Plainti1f shall recover costs against the owners on

the owners' appeal from the judgment for plaintiff. The
parties shall bear their own costs on the other appeals.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

)

